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ABSTRACT 
The use of digital dossiers by the Public Prosecution and 
Courts is an example of how technology will change 
today's law practice. The potential has been experienced 
in pilot projects in Amsterdam and Rotterdam.  The legal, 
organisational and technological requirements, however, 
are numerous: sensitive data is acquired from distributed 
sources; consistency and completeness need to be 
guaranteed.  This paper proposes a conceptual framework 
for digital dossier management, based on the use of 
dedicated software agents.  To this purpose a number of 
underlying taxonomies are introduced: for the data, the 
dossier management processes, software agents and 
distributed environments. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The use of digital dossiers by the Public Prosecution and 
Courts is an example of how technology changes today's 
law practice [1]. Digital dossiers, prepared by the Public 
Prosecutor, are shared by the judge(s), the Public 
Prosecutor, the Defence and the clerks involved. (Note 
that their notes are not necessarily shared; each of these 
parties decides whether and with whom to share his/her 
notes). Currently the digital dossier is based on paper 
versions of relevant files: these files are scanned and 
stored as pdf-files in the digital dossier [2]. A web-based 
user interface allows a user to access the digital dossier. In 
the future the digital dossier will also contain XML 
(parsable) content and include multi-media material 
(sound, images and video). 
 
Digital dossiers are challenging because of the many 
requirements: legal, technological and organisational. Not 
only do the dossiers contain much sensitive data but they 
are also part of a large-scale distributed environment. In 
this environment different data sources are distributed 
both physically and across organizations that need to 
work together within fixed boundaries set by the law to 
manage a dossier.  
 
Agent technology is a promising technology for large-
scale distributed environments and supports modularity, 
security and scalability in these environments.  Dedicated 
software agents make it possible to clearly separate tasks, 
responsibilities and integration of new functionalities.  
 
This paper proposes a conceptual framework, based on a 
taxonomy of core elements of digital dossier management 
viz. data in the dossier and dossier management 
processes, but also taxonomies of software agents and 
distributed environments [3]. The conceptual framework 
indicates which types of software agents can support 
which kinds of data, dossier management processes and 
distributed environments. Different parts of the taxonomy 
can be used independently or combined in different 
situations for different purposes. The focus in this paper is 
on the role of agent technology in relation to dossier 
management processes and data and on agent technology 
in relation to distributed environments.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sketches a 
scenario that briefly explains the context of Dutch 
criminal proceedings.  This scenario is used to illustrate 
the application of the taxonomies for digital dossier 
management. Section 3 presents taxonomies for digital 
dossier management: data in the digital dossier, dossier 
management processes, software agents and distributed 
environments. Section 4, the core of the paper, presents a 
conceptual framework for digital dossier management, 
relating agents to data, dossier management processes and 
distributed environments. Section 5 briefly indicates how 
the taxonomies and conceptual framework can be used by 
organizations in criminal proceedings and ends with a 
discussion and conclusions. 
 
2.  Scenario 
In Dutch criminal proceedings numerous organizations 
are involved. Criminal proceedings start with a criminal 
investigation, usually followed by a trial, a verdict and the 
execution of a sentence. An example of the Dutch 
criminal proceedings for a juvenile repeat offender is 
described below. This same scenario has previously been 
presented in [2]. This scenario is sketched to briefly 
explain the context of Dutch criminal proceedings and to 
illustrate the application of the taxonomies for digital 
dossier management in the following sections.  
 
A police officer arrests a juvenile suspect for vandalism 
and escorts him to the police station where an assistant 
prosecutor questions the suspect. The Police opens a new 
dossier which contains a summary of the offence for 
which the suspect is being charged, the date and location 
of the incident, number of suspects, personal data of the 
victim, the official police report, and other relevant data. 
The personal data the suspect has provided is cross-
referenced with the municipal database.  (Note that in the 
Netherlands each municipality stores such data for each 
resident). The Police also queries local repeat offender 
databases to discover whether this suspect is a known 
repeat offender. 
 
Because a minor suspect is involved, the Police issues a 
request to other organizations for juvenile offenders. 
These organizations provide relevant data about the 
minor’s background. All of this data is added to the 
dossier. After collecting this data, the Police and the 
Assistant Prosecutor inform the Public Prosecutor of the 
case and transfer the dossier. The Public Prosecutor 
decides whether to press charges or, to pursue an 
alternative if other (minor) punishment is deemed more 
suitable. This decision is based both on the current case 
and the (criminal) history of the suspect. A dedicated 
Judicial Documentation Database is used to retrieve data 
on the criminal past of the suspect. Typically, at this 
point, the Public Prosecutor will again consult Municipal 
Databases and local Juvenile Repeat Offender Systems. 
All data is cross-referenced with the case dossier and 
information is updated when needed. 
 
The Public Prosecutor decides to bring the case to Court. 
The next mandatory step involves informing the Child 
Welfare Council of the case. In the Dutch context the 
Child Welfare Council has the task to investigate the 
crimes of minors. In addition to the criminal offences of 
the minor, the family situation and other relevant social 
factors are taken into account. This results in a motivated 
advice for suitable punishment of the suspect. This advice 
is added to the dossier. The prosecutor then summons the 
suspect and a lawyer is assigned to the juvenile suspect. 
Adding the summons to the dossier finalizes the dossier at 
this point. A copy of the dossier is sent to the Court and to 
the lawyer of the suspect. To check the correctness of the 
dossier, the presiding judge may query judicial history 
and other judicial documentation in the Judicial 
Documentation Database as well as information from 
Municipal and other databases. At the court session all 
parties involved use the information in the dossier. The 
Public Prosecutor demands a suitable sentence, the lawyer 
presents the defence and ultimately the judge comes to a 
verdict. The suspect is sentenced and all data regarding 
the court session is added to the dossier. The dossier itself 
is filed in Judicial Documentation Database for future 
reference. 
 
 
3.  Taxonomies 
 
In this section the core elements of digital dossier 
management are presented: data in the dossier, dossier 
management processes, software agents and distributed 
environments. These taxonomies represent one possible 
classification scheme for each of these elements. 
 
3.1 Data in the Dossier 
 
Digital dossiers contain both sensitive and less sensitive 
data. Sensitive data may cause damage when illegally 
used or used in the wrong context. Law usually protects 
this data. Such sensitive data can only be stored and 
processed for a specific purpose and task. In the scenario 
described in the previous section the Police is only 
allowed to store personal data of suspects that is strictly 
necessary for its task of tracking down juvenile suspects. 
Sensitive data can and must only be provided, and 
processed, by persons and organisations mentioned by 
law. Less sensitive data is data that may be made 
available to the general public. Data on, for example, 
specific legislation that was used in the juvenile scenario 
can be made available on the Internet for use in similar 
cases.  
 
The specific data stored in a digital dossier depends on the 
offence involved. Standard templates can be defined for 
each type of offence. 
 
3.2 Dossier Management Processes 
 
Important dossier management processes are 
completeness and consistency checking, controlling 
access, organizing the dossier, user interaction and 
physical data protection measures such as back-up 
procedures.   
 
• Completeness check [2]: 
- Determining for which type of offence 
which data is mandatory;  
- Checking if all the mandatory data is in the 
dossier. 
 
• Consistency check [2]: 
- Checking whether the data for a dossier is 
consistent with all other data in the dossier; 
- Checking reasonable entries and possible 
values in data fields.  
• Access control:  
- Granting rights with regard to the dossier 
based on specific security policies [1]; 
- Checking role based access [4]: who may 
change existing data in the dossier and 
create new dossiers; 
- Limiting the access of individuals by 
checking whether their identity is on a list 
associated with the dossier [5]; 
- Adding meta-data to the dossier on specific 
human or software agents that may change, 
read, delete or add information to a dossier. 
 
• Organizing the dossier:  
- Adding the right meta-data to the dossier 
such as the name, author(s) and status of the 
dossier and its documents; 
- Indexing information in the dossier; 
- Deploying effective retrieval techniques. 
 
• User interaction: 
- Inventory aspects of the interface of the 
digital dossier that define its behaviour; 
- Inventory of user's goals, expectations, 
behaviours, and needs; 
- Making the dossier’s user interface respond 
to the user's experience. 
 
• Physical data protection - back ups: 
- Making an image of the entire dossier or 
parts of the dossier; 
- Replacing the digital dossier or one or more 
files without influencing the rest of the 
dossier while doing so; 
- Comparing old versions of dossiers or parts 
of dossiers with current versions of dossiers. 
 
3.3 Agent Technology 
 
Software agents are software systems that are (to some 
degree) autonomous and pro-active, have the ability to 
communicate with other agents and to react to their 
environment [6].  They may, in addition, be mobile – able 
to migrate from one physical location to another, and be 
able to learn from their interactions with other agents and 
their environment. 
 
Agent technology provides a means to distribute 
responsibilities and tasks across the many interacting 
distributed autonomous systems in criminal proceedings. 
This makes it possible and easier, compared to the current 
situation to, for example, find out who took the decision 
to not make specific information available to the lawyer, 
according to what rule and on what law are those rules 
based.  
 
Dedicated software agents can, for example, also be 
designed to perform the task of guarding consistency of 
data both within a source, and between sources within the 
digital dossier, and notifying appropriate (human) parties 
when needed. With respect to completeness, dedicated 
agents can monitor the availability of necessary 
documents in the digital dossier. For instance, a trial 
cannot start if a copy of the original police report is not in 
the digital dossier.  
 
Agent technology also offers the possibility for a gradual 
construction. Initially it is possible to develop agents for 
relative simple tasks. Subsequently, the complexity of 
these tasks can gradually be increased. Legal 
professionals in criminal proceedings can experience their 
potential. Agents can be developed according to the 
specific wishes of their users. In the context of criminal 
proceedings specific and dedicated agents can be 
developed with the level of security required by their 
users and can be authorized by their users to only access 
specific sources.  
 
As a relatively closed environment, the context of the 
criminal proceedings is a good starting point to gradually 
explore the use of intelligent agents and their interaction 
with users in this environment. In the long run, by 
gradually adding new functionality, responsibilities, 
suitable security techniques and thereby building trust 
amongst human users, these agents can be deployed in 
more open environments such as the Internet for specific 
types of information. 
 
The following categorization of agent technology 
represents the functionality needed in, and suited for the 
domain of criminal proceedings [6]: 
 
• Authorized authenticated mobile agents: 
Authorized authenticated mobile agents are standard 
equipped with rights to access specific sources. They 
can identify themselves and they can be linked to 
their human owner. It is possible to verify whether 
these agents are who they claim to be. Authorized 
authenticated mobile agents are equipped with the 
right credentials. They interact with other agents (and 
possibly humans) in an agent-communication 
language. Authorized authenticated mobile agents do 
not simply act in response to their environment; they 
are able to exhibit goal-directed behaviour by taking 
the initiative (i.e. they are pro-active). They take the 
initiative rather than acting simply in response to 
their environment [7]. Authorized authenticated 
mobile agents operate without the direct guidance 
and intervention of humans or others, and have some 
level of control over their actions and internal state 
[7]. They are situated within an environment, can 
sense the environment, can act on it, over time, in 
pursuit of their own agenda and so as to effect what it 
senses in the future [8]. Authorized authenticated 
mobile agents migrate between organizations. 
 
• Unauthorized anonymous mobile agents: 
Unauthorized anonymous mobile agents cannot 
always identify themselves and cannot always be 
linked to their human owner. They are not 
automatically equipped with the right credentials. It is 
possible though to authenticate them by providing 
them with credentials of, for example, a third party. 
They interact with other agents (and possibly 
humans) in an agent-communication language. 
Unauthorized anonymous mobile agents do not 
simply act in response to their environment; they are 
able to exhibit goal-directed behaviour by taking the 
initiative. They take the initiative rather than acting 
simply in response to their environment [7]. 
Unauthorized anonymous mobile agents operate 
without the direct guidance and intervention of 
humans or others, and have some kind of control over 
their actions and internal state [7]. An unauthorized 
anonymous mobile agent is situated within an 
environment, senses that environment and acts on it, 
over time, in pursuit of its own agenda and so as to 
effect what it senses in the future [8]. Unauthorized 
anonymous mobile agents can migrate between 
organizations. 
 
• Authorized authenticated static agents: Authorized 
authenticated static agents can identify themselves 
and can be linked to their human owner. It is possible 
to verify whether these agents are who they claim to 
be. They are standard equipped access rights to 
specific sources and posses the right credentials. Each 
organization has complete control of all of its own 
authorized authenticated static agents. Authorized 
authenticated static agents perceive their 
environment, and respond in a timely fashion to 
changes that occur in the environment [7]. They 
interact with other agents (and possibly humans) in 
an agent-communication language. 
 
• Unauthorized anonymous static agents: 
Unauthorized anonymous static agents cannot always 
identify themselves and cannot always be linked with 
their user. In case of unauthorized anonymous static 
agents, organisations administer their own agents. 
Unauthorized anonymous static agents are not 
automatically equipped with the right credentials. It is 
possible though to authenticate them by providing 
them with credentials of, for example, a third party. 
Each organization has complete control of all running 
agents. Unauthorized anonymous static agents 
perceive their environment, and respond in a timely 
fashion to changes that occur in the environment [7]. 
They interact with other agents (and possibly 
humans) via in an agent-communication language. 
 
3.4  Environments 
 
The digital dossier is part of closed environments, semi-
open environments and open environments.  
 
• Closed environment: data is only made available to 
authorized parties within the organisation.  
 
• Semi-open environment: data is made available to 
authorized parties outside of the organisation. 
 
• Open environment: data is available to external 
organisations. 
 
4. A Conceptual Framework for Dossier 
Management 
 
The potential roles of the different types of agent and 
environments distinguished in Section 3, in dossier 
management processes is depicted in Table 1.  This table 
indicates the extent to which the different agents can be 
expected to support dossier management processes and 
how well the different agents can be expected to support 
the various environments: 
 
+  =  Support is available 
+/-  =  Needs some support and 
-  =  Offers insufficient support 
 
The resulting framework can be used by organizations in 
criminal proceedings as a starting point and should be 
refined for specific situations. 
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Data and dossier 
management 
processes 
    
Check completeness 
and consistency of 
sensitive data in the 
dossier 
+/- +/- + - 
Check completeness 
and consistency of less 
sensitive data in the 
dossier 
+ - + - 
Back-up  + + +/- +/- 
Access control + + +/- +/- 
Organization of the 
dossier 
+/- +/- + + 
User interaction + +/- + +/- 
Environments     
Closed environment + - + +/- 
Semi-open 
environment 
+ +/- + +/- 
Open environment + + + + 
 
• Check Completeness and Consistency of Sensitive 
and Less Sensitive Data in the Dossier: 
Completeness and consistency checks of both 
sensitive and insensitive data can best be assigned to 
authorized authenticated static agents as on basis of 
their authentication and authorization they can be 
trusted more to act accordingly. This is also true for 
authorized authenticated mobile agents, although then 
logging needs to be well regulated for both types of 
data. Assigning completeness and consistency checks 
to both types of unauthorized anonymous agents is 
not advisable, as it is unclear to which organisation 
responsibility has been delegated. 
 
• Back-up: In case of backing-up sensitive and 
valuable data authentication and authorization are 
important requirements. Stakeholders need 
information on or experience with the way agents 
have successfully back-upped data in the past. 
Having unauthorized anonymous agents backing-up 
data is a risk as information about their past actions is 
not always known and so their future back-up actions 
are hard to predict. Authorized authenticated mobile 
agents support the requirement of authentication.  
Unauthorized anonymous static agents support the 
requirement of authentication when provided with the 
right credentials of, for example, a trusted third party.  
 
• Access Control: Authentication plays a major role in 
access control. Authorized authenticated mobile and 
static agents support this requirement. Unauthorized 
anonymous agents may, but they will need to provide 
credentials.   
 
• Organization of the Dossier: Agents need to react to 
changes in their direct environment concerning 
preferred ways of organizing dossiers. Authorized 
authenticated static agents meet this requirement the 
best followed by unauthorized anonymous static 
agents. Pro-activity is needed to investigate the 
environment of the dossier and take the initiative in 
inventory preferences to organize dossiers.  
 
• User Interaction: Agents decide for themselves how 
they interact with human agents, including their 
owner. Coordination of user interaction between 
different agents may be needed, requiring additional 
knowledge to this purpose.  There is little difference 
between the ability of static and mobile agents to 
communicate with human agents.  Interaction with 
unauthorized anonymous agents may not always be 
opportune depending on the content. 
 
• Closed Environment: A requirement in a closed 
environment is that the users are able to authenticate 
agents in that environment. Authorized authenticated 
static agents and unauthorized anonymous static 
agents (when equipped with credentials) meet this 
requirement. Parties in closed environments must 
know each other in order to access, exchange and 
process data. Authorized authenticated mobile and 
static agents meet this requirement in opposite to 
unauthorized anonymous mobile and static agents, 
unless they have the right credentials.  
 
• Semi-open Environment: In the semi-open 
environment of criminal proceedings autonomy plays 
a role that can be supported by authorized 
authenticated mobile agents and unauthorized 
anonymous mobile agents. Each organization can 
have agents that decide for themselves what data to 
exchange and with whom. In case of sensitive data 
exchange at least some intervention by human agents 
remains important. Authorized authenticated static 
agents and unauthorized anonymous static agents 
support this requirement.  In all cases agents must be 
relied upon that they can decide for themselves to 
send specific data to the right organization in criminal 
proceedings. Authorized authenticated static agents 
and unauthorized anonymous static agents have the 
advantage in this environment that their users can 
control them locally.  There are also parties in this 
environment though that do not necessarily have to 
control agents locally. In this case authorized 
authenticated mobile agents and unauthorized 
anonymous mobile agents are of use.  In the semi-
open environment of criminal proceedings most 
parties know each other. In such an environment 
authorized authenticated mobile agents and 
authorized authenticated static agents seem to be 
preferable, especially when exchanging sensitive 
data. Unauthorized anonymous mobile agents and 
unauthorized anonymous static agents can be used 
though to retrieve and exchange the less sensitive 
data in this environment.  
 
• Open Environment: Agents in an open environment 
do not necessarily need to be controlled by the users 
in this environment and can have much autonomy in 
this environment. In some cases authorized 
authenticated and unauthorized anonymous mobile 
agents are suited while in other cases authorized 
authenticated static agents and unauthorized 
anonymous static agents are suited.  
 
The next section discusses how the framework might be 
used to assist organizations in criminal proceedings. 
 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
This paper proposes a conceptual framework based on 
taxonomies for digital dossier management, viz. data in 
the dossier, dossier management processes, agents and 
environments.  
 
Taxonomies of the core elements of dossier management 
can help organizations in criminal proceedings to clarify 
their needs regarding distributed information processing. 
This is important, because of the central role dossiers play 
in criminal proceedings. The. This paper describes how 
taxonomies for dossier management can be used in 
criminal proceedings. In future research the taxonomies 
need to be further elaborated upon. The various entries of 
the table should be refined, and where appropriate divided 
into subcategories. Obviously, the relation between data 
in the dossier, data management processes and 
environments also needs to be described.  
 
The conceptual framework, based on the taxonomies, 
indicates which type of agents may preferably be used to 
support which kinds of data, processes and environments. 
Agent technology can support more than one dossier 
management process, but there is no overview in criminal 
proceedings of what dossier management processes are 
important to each organization. It is, however, clear that 
agent technology should not be used randomly to support 
dossier management processes. By organizing dossier 
management processes of organizations in criminal 
proceedings it becomes clearer which dossier 
management processes are important to them.  
 
The paper also provides organizations in criminal 
proceedings a general overview of various means of agent 
technology support. By making clear distinctions between 
forms of agent technology support, it becomes easier for 
organizations in criminal proceedings to select the right 
type of support.  
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